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(6) Further, even if these authorities had been relevant, where a single document is 
on its face intended to be signed by more than one person, liability will usually be 
conditional on signature by both or all named persons: see Capital Allowances at [ 17]. 
In this case, it was apparent on the face of the document that both H and W were to be 
parties. Therefore, if this line of authority had been relevant, it would have pointed in 
the opposite direction. 
(7) Marlbray's intention is not addressed until the passage beginning "Still less ... ". 19 
But the unexplained "still less" is clearly unjustified. Marlbray's intention was far 
more open to question than H's. H signed knowing that he did not have W's authority. 
Marlbtay did not know and had contracted on the basis that it had two counterparties 
liable for the price. Its position would be weakened if there was only one, especially if 
the remaining counterparty was unreliable enough to have misrepresented his authority. 
There is obviously "support" for the analysis that Marlbray was only contracting on 
the basis that W was a purchaser; it is what the contract says. It was accordingly wrong 
to say that "there is nothing in the factual matrix" which could lead to the conclusion 
that Marlbray did not intend to sell to H alone if he was not authorised by W. The Court 
of Appeal failed to address either the terms of the contract or the relevant features of 
the factual matrix, or to consider objectively how a party in Marlbray's position would 
have been likely to react to the potential financial disadvantage of W's non-liability. 
There was no sensible argument to the contrary. It is respectfully submitted that this 
appeal was wrongly decided. 
Nicholas Strauss* 
ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS AND THE ESCAPE CLAUSE UNDER 
THE ROME II REGULATION 
Marshall v MIB 
In determining the applicable law to non-contractual liability arising from cross-border 
traffic accidents, the Rome IT Regulation, Art.4.3, provides for an "escape clause" which 
permits application of the law of the country to which the tort/delict is manifestly more 
closely connected, displacing that indicated in paras 1 (lex loci damni) or 2 (law of the 
common habitual residence of the parties when the damage occurs). In the absence of 
interpretation of this provision by the European Court of Justice, the High Court judgment 
Marshal/ v Motor Insurers' Bureau1 is one of few discussing the escape clause in detail 
and provides a welcome clarification of the principles applicable to one of the central 
19. At [68]. See ante, emphasised text following fn.5. 
* QC; formerly a deputy judge of the High Court. The author was the trial judge in Marlbray. The point 
discussed in this note was conceded at trial and the appeal, on this point, was not in any real sense against the 
first instance decision. The issue was explicitly referred to by the Court of Appeal as a "New Contractual Issue". 
1. [2015] EWHC 3421 (QB); [2016] Lloyd's Rep IR 400. 
CASE AND COMMENT 475 
provisions of Rome II. In this judgment the High Court emphasises the exceptional nature 
of the "manifestly more closely connected principle" and concludes that Art.4.3 places a 
high hurdle in the path of a party seeking to displace the law indicated by Art.4.1 or 4.2. 
Nevertheless, the Court found itself able to apply Art.4.3 and override Art.4.2, so that a 
manifestly closer connection overrode common habitual residence. 
Mr Pickard, a UK national habitually resident in England, was travelling in a Ford 
Fiesta vehicle with trailer attached, just south of Paris on the A86 road with Mr Marshall, 
also a UK national habitually resident in England, as his passenger. The vehicle was 
registered in the United Kingdom and was insured by Royal & Sun Alliance ("RSA"). 
The car broke down, so Mr Pickard stopped on the hard shoulder and telephoned the 
breakdown service, which arrived at the scene to repair the vehicle. The recovery truck 
was registered in France and insured by Generali France Assurances ("Generali"). While 
Mr Pickard's car was being repaired, an uninsured Peugeot motor vehicle registered in 
France, driven by Ms Bivard, a French national habitually resident in France, collided 
with the trailer, hitting Mr Pickard and Mr Marshall. Ms Bivard's vehicle, that of the 
victims Messrs Marshall and Pickard, and also the recovery truck were all involved in the 
collision. As a result, Mr Pickard suffered fractures to his right leg and other injuries to his 
neck and head, while Mr Marshal! died as a result of multiple injuries. 
Following the accident, two court actions were filed in England. In the first, Mr Mars hall's 
widow filed a claim against the Motor Insurers' Bureau ("MIB"), with Mr Pickard and 
the RSA (his vehicle insurance company) as second defendant, and as a third defendant, 
Generali (the recovery truck company's insurers). Mrs Marshall claimed compensation for 
her husband's death. In a preliminary ruling, the court deliberated on the applicable law 
in a case of non-contractual liability and the need to apply the Rome II Regulation. In this 
regard, RSA alleged that the direct damage had taken place in England, as this was where 
Mrs Marshal! had suffered her loss of dependency. However, the court considered that 
the direct damage had occurred in France, where the accident occurred, contrasting with 
Arden LJ's view in Brownlie v Four Seasons Holding Jnc2 and agreeing with the Advocate 
General, N Wahl, in Florin Lazar v Allianz SpA,3 stating that the expression "country in 
which the damage occurs" contained in Art.4.1 refers to the place of direct damage, and 
in this case that would be the place where the victim died following the crash, because all 
the damages incurred arose from the same incident. 
As the court had rejected the contention that English law was applicable through the 
lex loci damni, RSA went on to allege that it would still be applicable, on the grounds 
that England was the place where, not only the person claimed to be liable (in this case 
Mr Pickard and RSA) but also the person sustaining damage (Mrs Marshal!), were resident 
at the time when the damage occurred. Conversely, Mrs Marshall as claimant and the other 
two respondents (the MIB compensation body and the insurance company Generali) held 
that Art.4.2 was applicable only as an exception to the general rule of the lex loci damni in 
cases in which the action involved two parties, citing the singular nature of the wording of 
the precept "where the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage" and 
clearly, as there were several respondents in Marshall, this was not the case. However, the 
2. [2015] EWCA Civ 665; [2016]1 WLR 1814, [85-87]. 
3. (Case C-350/14) [2016]1 WLR 835 (ECJ). 
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High Court considered this reasoning to be unsustainable, as it would preclude application 
of Art.4.2 in cases where there were several claimants. Instead, it considered that the 
exception should be based on the legitimate expectations of the parties, and therefore 
should not be interpreted in the light of there being a single party only. Furthermore, the 
precept cannot be interpreted in the sense of considering a single claimant and a single 
respondent, because that would restrict application of the exception as understood by 
English law, thus omitting the consideration that this is a European Union Regulation and 
its provisions should be interpreted in an autonomous manner. Thus, the fact that all the 
parties lived in England at the time of the accident led the court to apply English law, to 
the detriment of French law, as the lex loci damni. 
On this basis, the court had to examine the possibility of applying the escape clause 
and addressing how the concept "manifestly more closely connected with a country other 
than that indicated in paras 1 or 2" should be interpreted. In addition to the difficulty of 
identifying the relevant circumstances for confirming the closer connection with another 
country, the court was also required to address the rather complex relation between para.3 
and paras 1 and 2 of Art.4, as the wording of para.3 was clearly ambiguous. Scholarly 
literature holds that interpretation of this precept should enable the escape clause to be 
cited, which would make the law relating to the common habitual residence of the parties 
inapplicable, to the benefit of the lex loci damni, as this is a general exception clause and 
the link should be with a country other than that designated, according to either para.1 or 2.4 
This makes application of this concept more flexible, as may be seen from a reading 
of recital 14 of the Regulation. Therefore, the court had to decide whether compliance 
with that condition should be made cumulatively, that is, that the designated law should 
be different from French and English law, or, conversely, it would be sufficient to comply 
individually, and the result could be either of these laws, French or English, because it 
has been justified as being the law more closely connected to the tort/delict. Use of the 
disjunctive conjunction "or" in the text should leave no doubt, as it proposes alternative 
options; and in this case it would be sufficient for there to be a law other than French law 
(lex loci damni) or English law (habitual residence in common). 
Finally, the High Court takes a view similar to that in Winrow v Hemphil/,5 confirming 
that the exceptional application of Art.4.3 of the Regulation is a considerable obstacle 
for the party claiming application of the escape clause, to the detriment of the designated 
law according to the first and second paras of Art.4, and that it is necessary to show that 
the "centre of gravity" of the case is with the suggested applicable law. Furthermore, the 
court was aware that it must take all the circumstances of the case into consideration when 
determining whether it is appropriate to apply the escape clause and, having enumerated 
and analysed the circumstances of the case in this matter, it confirmed that the tort/delict 
was manifestly more closely connected with France, basing its decision on the following 
4. See generally, CS Adesina Okoli and G Omoshemime Arishe, "The operation of the escape clauses in 
the Rome Convention, Rome I Regulation and Rome ll Regulation" (2012) 8(3) JPIL 542; A Dickinson, The 
Rome lJ Regulation: The law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), 
343; and J von Hein, "Of older siblings and distant cousins: The contribution of the Rome 11 Regulation to the 
Communitarisation of Private International Law" (2009) 73 Rabel Jl of Comparative and International Private 
Law461. 
5. [2014] EWHC 3164 (QB), [63]. 
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proven facts: (a) Messrs Marshall and Pickard were run over on a French motorway by a 
French vehicle, registered in France and driven by Ms Bivard, a French national whose 
habitual residence was in France; (b) the legal action taken by Messrs Marshal! (or his 
wife on his behalf) and Pickard against Ms Bivard and his insurance company (in this case 
Ponds de Garantie as the vehicle was not insured) are governed by French law; (c) Ms 
Bivard's collision with Messrs Marshall and Pickard was the cause of the accident and the 
injuries that they both suffered; and (d) the claims brought by Mr Marshall's widow and 
Mr Pickard against the company Generali as insurer of the recovery truck would also be 
subject to French law. 
In short, the High Court applies the escape clause, thus applying French law to the issue 
of liability of the claims made by Mr Marshall's widow, and rendering inapplicable the 
law designated by virtue of the parties' habitual residence in common when the damage 
occurs, namely English law. 
Raul Lafuente Sanchez* 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND BREACH OF STATUTORY DUTY 
Campbell v Cordon 
In Campbell v Cordon, 1 the Supreme Court held, by a majority of three to two, that 
breach by the corporate employer of its obligation to arrange adequate insurance under 
the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 does not give rise to civil 
liability on the part of the director. In practice, this means that an aggrieved employee 
who suffers from her corporate employer's failure to arrange insurance does not have an 
alternative course for redress if the corporate employer is insolvent or is not worth suing. 
The Supreme Court decision is significant for settling any lingering uncertainty left by 
the much-criticised Court of Appeal decision in Richardson v Pitt-Stanley2 (which had 
reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court) and its discussion of the circumstances 
in which a court will infer parliamentary intention to permit civil liability where a penal 
statute is silent. This comment argues that the majority's decision is to be supported, but 
that it is regrettable that the court did not address the inconsistencies in the authorities on 
causes of action arising from breach of statutory duty. 
The background 
The Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969 provides, by s.l(l), that: 
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act, every employer carrying on any business in Great Britain 
shall insure, and maintain insurance, under one or more approved policies with an authorized insurer 
* Senior Lecturer in Private International Law, University of Alicante, Spain; Visiting Scholar, Wolfson 
College, University of Oxford. 
1. [2016] UKSC 38; [2016) Lloyd's Rep IR 591. 
2. [1995) QB 123. 
